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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
Co 
MICHAEL J. HAWK, DONALD M. 
HILL, and JAYE M. JACKSON 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STEVEN ODOM and 
MARTIN KIDDER 
Defendants. 
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)( 
)( 
)( 
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-------------------------)( 
Civil Action File No. 2009CV162588 
FILED IN OFFICE 
JUlI02009 
DEPUlYCLERKSUPeRIORCOURr 
fUllONCOUNlY. GA 
ORDER 
On July 1, 2009, Counsel appeared before this Court to present oral argument on Defendant 
Odom's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Kidder's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
After hearing the arguments made by counsel and reviewing the briefs submitted on the motions and 
the record in the case, the Court finds as follows: 
I. Facts 
This case arises out of a private placement offering ("the Transaction") through which 
Plaintiffs purchased stock in Verso Technologies, Inc. ("Verso"), a Minnesota corporation that is 
currently in bankruptcy. Defendant Steven A. Odom ("Odom") was the CEO of Verso, and Defendant 
Martin Kidder ("Kidder") was the CFO of Verso. 
On February 21, 2008, each Plaintiff executed a subscription agreement memorializing their 
purchase of Verso stock. Plaintiffs' representative for this transaction was Mr. Donald J. Slowinski 
y 
("Slowinksi"). Prior to Plaintiffs' purchase of Verso stock, Slowinski met with Odom and was the sole 
conduit of information between Odom and Plaintiffs regarding this Transaction. During their meeting, 
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Odom gave Slowinski a PowerPoint presentation about Verso that Plaintiffs allege contains material 
misrepresentations. 
Plaintiffs filed this action asserting claims for common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, 
and securities fraud under Georgia law. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that (1) Odom made material 
misrepresentations and omissions regarding Verso to Slowinski who passed this misinformation on to 
Plaintiffs, and that (2) Kidder sent Plaintiffs subscription agreements which were misleading in light of 
information that Kidder failed to disclose. 
II. Standard 
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to o.e.G.A. § 9-11-56 when the 
moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried and that the undisputed 
facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary judgment as a matter of 
law. Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 (1991). The moving party need only eliminate 
one essential element of a party's claim to prevail on summary judgment. Real Estate Int'l Inc. v. 
Buggah, 220 Ga. App. 449, 451 (1996). 
III. Kidder's Motion for Summary Judgment 
The record shows that Kidder's only involvement III the Transaction was to forward 
subscription agreements to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs concede that Kidder made no misrepresentations to 
them, or to Slowinski, and that the subscription agreements did not contain any misrepresentations. 
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs' claims against Kidder rest on alleged omissions only. 
Kidder argues that he had no duty to disclose information to Plaintiffs and, thus, Plaintiffs' 
fraud claims against him fail as a matter oflaw. 
Actionable fraud may be based on "[s]uppression of a material fact which a party is under an 
obligation to communicate." O.C.G.A. § 23-2-53. "The obligation to communicate may arise from the 
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confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case." Id. Plaintiffs do 
not dispute that they have never shared a confidential relationship with Kidder. Moreover, Plaintiffs 
have not established circumstances in this case that would impart to Kidder a duty to disclose. "Absent 
a confidential relationship, no duty to disclose exists between parties in arms-length business 
transactions." Lilliston v. Regions Bank, 288 Ga. App. 241, 244 (2007); see also, Bogle v. Bragg, 248 
Ga. App. 632, 636 (2001). The record reveals that this case arises from an arms-length business 
transaction. 
Defendant Kidder's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED. 
IV. Odom's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs' claims against Odom are based on both misrepresentations and omISSIOns. 
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the PowerPoint presentation they received regarding Verso contained 
misrepresentations, and that the presentation was especially misleading in light of omissions of 
information by Odom. Plaintiffs point to four specific omissions which, if known' to them prior to the 
transactions, would have ended their interest in buying Verso stock. The four omissions cited by 
Plaintiffs are: (1) Verso was at risk of receiving a "going concern" exception to its December 31, 2007 
financial audit; (2) Verso was generally unable to pay its debts as they became due; (3) Verso was at 
risk of losing its NASDAQ listing because of a failure to meet the minimum shareholders' equity 
requirements; and (4) Verso had booked fictitious sales. In light of these alleged omissions, Plaintiffs 
argue that it is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether Odom represented that Verso was 
merely struggling when it was, in fact, already dead on the vine. 
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Odom first argues that the merger clause 
contained in the sUbscription agreement bars Plaintiffs' claims. Specifically, the merger clause 
numbered section 9 in the agreement, provides that "[t]his Subscription Agreement contains the entire 
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agreement of the parties with respect to the matter set forth herein and there are no representations, 
covenants or other agreements except as stated or referred to herein or as are embodied in the Offering 
Documents." There are only two documents involved in the Transaction: (1) the subscription 
agreement and (2) the PowerPoint presentation about Verso which was given by Odom to Slowinski 
and passed on to Plaintiffs. Therefore, the only offering document to which the merger clause refers is 
the PowerPoint presentation. As the merger clause incorporates into the Parties' agreement the 
representations of the PowerPoint, the merger clause does not operate to bar Plaintiffs' claims based on 
misrepresentations found in the PowerPoint, or information in the PowerPoint presentation which is 
fraudulent in light of omitted information. 
Next, Odom argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs cannot have 
justifiably relied on Odom's representations. In support of this argument, Odom maintains that 
Slowinski's deposition testimony shows that he generally distrusted Odom, and that Slowinski's 
general distrust of Odom must be imputed to Plaintiffs because Slowinski was their agent for this 
Transaction. 
Despite Odom's arguments, many questions of fact persist that preclude the grant of summary 
judgment. Such questions of fact include: (1) whether plaintiffs relied on the representations made in 
the PowePoint presentation and if such reliance was reasonable, (2) whether Odom knew at the time he 
provided the PowerPoint presentation to Plaintiffs (through Slowinski) that Verso was on the brink of 
bankruptcy, and (3) whether Slowinski was, in fact, an agent of Plaintiffs so that under Georgia law his 
knowledge of the transactions and the player involved may be imputed to Plaintiffs. 
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Defendant Odom's motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED. 
v. Plaintiffs Offer of Rescission 
In their First Amended and Restated Complaint, Plaintiffs offer rescission of the subscription 
agreement as an alternative to damages. As Defendants are not parties to the sUbscription agreement 
which was entered into between Plaintiffs and Verso only, rescission is not an available remedy. 
Accordingly, this case shall proceed as one for damages only against Defendant Odom. 
SO ORDERED this 10th day of July, 2009. 
Copies to: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Mr. Jerry L. Sims, Esq. 
Sims, Moss, Kline & Davis 
Three Ravinia Drive, Suite 1700 
Atlanta, GA 30346 
Phone: 770-481-7200 
Fax: 770-481-7210 
Email: jlsims@smkdlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Mr. John G. Despriet, Esq. 
James E. Connelly, Esq. 
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP 
Promenade II, Suite 3100 
1230 Peachtree Street N.E. 
Atlanta, GA 30309-3592 
Phone: 404-815-3500 
Fax: 404-685-7030 
Email: jdespriet@sgrlaw.com 
jeconnelly@sgrlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Kidder 
Nisbet S. Kendrick, Esq. 
John G. Perry, Esq. 
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC 
One Atlantic Center 
1201 West Peachtree Street 
Suite 3500 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3574 
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(404) 888-7488 
kkendrick@wcsr.com; jperry@wcsr.com 
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